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TRADING THE PEOPLE’S HOMES FOR THE PEOPLE’S 
OLYMPICS:  THE PROPERTY REGIME IN CHINA 
 
 
Theresa H. Wang† 
 
Abstract:  China is under increasing international scrutiny as the country’s 
economic growth launches the previously isolated nation onto the world stage.  As the 
national wealth increases at a record rate, the government is constantly modifying 
strategies to ensure its economic stability.  In response to this nearly unmanageable 
growth, entire Chinese cities are remodeled and progressively more privatized, while 
urban dwellers are evicted from their homes in the name of economic development.  
These urban land acquisitions often occur with little or no compensation, while private 
developers reap the economic benefits.  These policies follow a pattern of development 
replayed throughout history, notably in the nineteenth-century United States.  This 
Comment focuses on these similarities, explores the fundamental differences between the 
American past and the Chinese present regarding property rights, acknowledges the 
improbability of China’s adopting Western models of governance wholesale, and 
ultimately argues the national government should reform its policies on urban 




 In 2000, Beijing finally won a long, hard-fought battle to be the host 
city for the 2008 Olympics.1  The streets of the city filled with jubilation and 
national pride as thousands of people flocked to Tiananmen Square—the 
once infamous plaza became a center of celebration.2  While the citizens 
rejoiced, the Chinese government immediately began preparations to build 
an Olympic project unprecedented in modern history.3  As a catalyst for the 
modernization of Beijing, the government cleared miles of residential land 
for new complexes and infrastructure in preparation for the critical eyes of 
the international community. 4   These actions are attracting worldwide 
                                                 
†  University of Washington School of Law, J.D. expected 2007.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Zang for his tireless enthusiasm, assistance, and invaluable advice at every stage of this Comment, 
the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, without whom this Comment would have been 
impossible, and of course, her family and friends for their support. 
1  Melinda Liu, Games and Grievances: When Officials Dreamed Up Catchphrases Like ‘The 
People’s Olympics’ Who Knew the Public Would Take the Words Seriously?, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 2005, at 
46. 
2  Lin Ting Li, 2008 Olympics, HARV. INT’L REV., April 1, 2005.  
3  Alan Abrahanson, Built in Commitment; Beijing Has Become a Huge Construction Site in Order 
to Stage the 2008 Olympics, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at D.5. 
4  Patrick A. Randolph, Professor, University of Missouri, Kansas City, Statement to the 
Congressional- Executive Commission on China Issues Roundtable: Property Seizures in China: Politics, 
Law, and Protest (February 3, 2003) available at http://cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/062104/Randolph.php. 
600 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 2 
scrutiny as hundreds of thousands of homes are taken in China’s drive for 
economic development.5   
 China, however, is no stranger to this kind of attention.  Controversial 
policies, such as the decision to undertake the project of the Three Gorges 
Dam, and the economy’s improbable growth, have effectively placed the 
previously secretive nation within the international gaze.6  With the pressure 
of being the fastest growing economy in the world,7 China is undertaking a 
large-scale urban renewal project with the aim of encouraging private 
development and new infrastructure.8  Collective urban land in China is 
increasingly allocated to private developers, transforming courtyard homes 
housing multiple families to commercial property.9  In Beijing alone, the 
government has evicted about 300,000 residents from their homes per year, 
sometimes forcefully, in order for the city to make way for the thirty-eight 
billion dollar Olympic project. 10  These evictions reportedly happen without 
notice, minimal or no compensation, and little legal recourse.11   
 In response to these forced evictions, the citizens have taken to the 
streets again, but not in celebration.12  According to one estimate, hundreds 
of thousands of displaced residents have participated in protests against 
forced evictions.13  These protests range from peaceful sit-ins and marches 
on Beijing, to self-immolation and suicide. 14   The Chinese government 
responded to these protests by arresting both protest leaders and lawyers 
attempting to defend the rights of the evicted.15   
                                                 
5  See discussion infra Part II.  
6  China is currently undertaking the most ambitious, largest man-made dam project in history on the 
Yangtze River.  For more discussion on dams and human rights implications, see Jen Lin-Liu, Out with the 
Old and in with the New around China’s Three Gorges Dam.  But at What Cost?, 192 ARCHITECTURAL 
REC. 57 (2004). 
7  See generally Charles Wolf Jr., China: An Emerging “Economic Superpower”?, in CHINA IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM, MARKET REFORMS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 11 (James A. Dorn ed., 1998). 
8  Forced Evictions and Land Requisitions, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 
2004 ANN. REP. (2005) available at http://cecc.gov/pages/virtual/Acad/rol/property2004.php?mode=print. 
Rural land requisitions are out of the scope of this Comment, for further discussion of this aspect, see RDI 
Memorandum from Brian Schwarzwalder, Roy Prosterman, & Li Ping, Land Takings in China: Policy 
Recommendations (June 5, 2003) (on file with RDI); PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 
(Jean C. Oi & Andrew G. Walder eds., 2005); Arjun Subrahmanyan, Land Use in China: The Impact of the 
Economic Revolution, 18  CHINA LAW & PRACTICE 24 (2004). 
9  See, e.g., Liu Qing, The Legal Time Bomb of Urban Redevelopment, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, No. 2, 
2003, at 68. 
10  Abrahamson, supra note 3. 
11  Sara Meg Davis & Lin Hai, Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenant’s Rights Movement in 
China, 16 HUM. RTS. WATCH 1,12. 
12  Id. at 3. 
13  Bill Savadove, Special Police Units to Counter Protests and Terrorism Threats, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, August 19, 2005, at 7. 
14  Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 1-3. 
15  Id. at 4. 
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 What might be surprising given this backdrop, however, is that the 
Chinese government has been taking steps toward a more definitive rule-of-
law, loosening its grip on social controls and acquiescing to more reforms.16  
This allowance led to recognition of property rights, even constitutional 
reforms acknowledging the right to compensation for the state’s use of 
eminent domain.17  There are official regulations that provide avenues for 
disputing the amount of compensation offered to the evictee, as well as a 
right to file civil suit for inadequate settlements at adjudication.18  The level 
of enforcement by the Chinese judiciary, however, leaves much to be desired.  
 Similar gaps between statutory authority and the political reality of 
property rights enforcement is a repetitive theme throughout world history.  
In the United States during the nineteenth century, early government 
regulation of urban land favored private development over individual land 
rights.19  Faced with a growing nation, the United States government was 
likewise under pressure to adapt to a rapidly growing market economy, and 
responded by putting its land into the hands of private developers.20  China’s 
current policies, albeit tumultuous, mimic strategies the United States 
undertook in times of national economic expansion.  The United States also 
prioritized economic development by transferring private property to the 
hands of private developers.   
While it is easy to encourage China to take the same course America 
did in granting absolute protection of individual property rights, the 
characteristics of the two countries differ to the extent that this wholesale 
adoption would be unreasonable.  Given the intensity of international 
scrutiny and social unrest in China now, the laws and procedure regarding 
the recent forced evictions is an ideal place to begin discussing Chinese 
property reform.  This Comment aims to reveal the similarities between 
Chinese economic development and the early American market evolution, as 
well as explore the fundamental differences between the two.  Part II of this 
Comment briefly describes the Chinese government’s historic property 
regime, traces its evolution to current reforms in individual property rights, 
and addresses international agreements and the ramifications of China’s 
                                                 
16  Legal Reforms in China, a Hollow Mantra?, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, July 8, 2005. 
17  Chan Siu-sin, Draft Property Law Allows Abuse, Says Analyst, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 
July 11, 2005. 
18  Chengshi fangwu chaiqian guanli tiaoli [Administrative Regulations on Urban House Demolition 
and Relocation] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 13, 2001, effective Nov. 
1, 2001), art 16, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005)(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Administrative 
Regulations]. 
19  WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 128 (1996). 
20  Id. 
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membership in the global community.  In addition, it clarifies how current 
property rights and the eviction process function, both in codified form and 
practically, focusing on the problematic gap between the two.  Part III 
compares these Chinese policies with those of nineteenth century America, 
exploring early American jurisprudence that allowed massive allocations of 
public resources to private developers.  Part IV emphasizes the similarities 
between the two countries’ methods and suggests that absolute property 
rights are simply not conducive to economic development, whether in early 
America or current Chinese policies.  Finally, Part V offers a realistic 
solution to the problem of forced evictions, applying recent Chinese judicial 
reforms to battle corruption at the adjudication level to take steps toward an 
equitable system.  This section will also argue that it is in China’s best 
interest both globally and domestically to revise its eviction process by 
revisiting the subject of international scrutiny.  This Comment ultimately 
recommends such changes as a positive step to renew faith in the system, 
quell the criticism of the government, and refocus global attention on the 
positive changes within the Chinese government.     
 
II. THE EVOLVING CHINESE PROPERTY REGIME IS A DRAMATIC 
DEPARTURE FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S TRADITIONAL 
PRINCIPLES 
 
 The increased protection of property rights since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) is a remarkable evolution in itself.  
Upon the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese 
Communist Party (“CCP”) 21  invoked massive land reform policies, 
transferring most privately owned land into the hands of the common 
collective.22  Since then, however, the government has undergone massive 
changes, including widespread privatization of its urban land.23   
 
A. China’s Property Law Has Gone from Virtually Nonexistent to Being 
a Constitutionally Recognized Right in Just over Two Decades  
  
 Given the historical background of the property regime in communist 
China, the recent Constitutional amendments recognizing individual 
                                                 
21  As the Chinese government operates under a one-party system, the term “CCP” is used 
interchangeably with “the state” and “the government” in this Comment. 
22  JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 516 (1990). 
23  Andrew G. Walder & Jean C. Oi, Property Rights in the Chinese Economy: Contours of the 
Process of Change, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 11 (Jean C. Oi & Andrew G. 
Walder eds., 1999). 
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property rights are revolutionary.  Though the early PRC recognized a 
degree of private property rights in urban areas, the CCP regularly 
confiscated privately owned property for “national construction” under the 
Maoist regime from 1949 to 1976.24  Most of the urban land holdings in 
China were private despite the Communist regime, as property ownership 
was undefined, but allowed to a small degree in the early 1950s.25  By the 
late 1950s, the Chinese government had exerted extensive control over the 
land in its cities, rendering private ownership extremely weak. 26   The 
vulnerability of private ownership was pushed further to ruination during the 
tumultuous Maoist campaigns, initiated in the name of “constant 
revolution.”27  Following the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, China lost 
any semblance of the rule of law, creating a chaotic environment that 
instigated a policy change from “class struggle” to “economic 
development.”28  This new interpretation of socialism entailed a redefinition 
of the communist property regime and the CCP’s policies regarding 
ownership.29 
The death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent rise of Deng Xiaopeng 
in 1978 gave birth to a modified Communist China.30  In this rebirth, the 
concept of individual or corporate property rights regained some definition, 
both legally and in practice.31  This new administration searched for a way to 
merge central economic planning with market principles. 32   Deng’s 
declaration that “urban individual residents can purchase houses, they can 
sell them, and they can also benefit from them”33 fleshed out a notion of a 
“bundle” of property rights the private citizen could hold.34  Though initially 
directed at encouraging foreign investment to stimulate China’s then-
                                                 
24  WILLIAM D. SOILEAU, PAST IS PRESENT: URBAN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND HOUSING REFORM 
IN THE P.R.C. 12 (1994). 
25  Id. at 13. 
26  Id. at 28-29. 
27  SPENCE, supra note 22, at 704.   
28  Yingyi Qian, The Process of China’s Market Transition (1978-98): The Evolutionary, Historical, 
and Comparative Perspectives, Paper Prepared for the Symposium on “Big-Bang Transformation of 
Economic Systems as a Challenge to New Institutional Economics,” in J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON., June 9-11, 1999, at 4. 
29  Id. at 16. 
30  See generally SUZANNE OGDEN, CHINA’S UNRESOLVED ISSUES 349-362 (1995) (parenthetical 
explanation here). 
31  Louis Putterman, The Role of Ownership and Property Rights in China’s Economic Transition, 
144 China Q. 1047, 1048 (1995). 
32  Yingyi Qian, supra note 28, at 9. 
33  SOILEAU, supra note 24, at 58. 
34  See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTION, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990) (arguing that modern property rights are stabilized in institutions ensuring clear 
contractual and property rights). 
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struggling economy, this policy eventually affected domestic property rights 
as well.35  Deng’s administration, realizing the importance of joining the 
world market and gaining the confidence of foreign investors, allowed 
certain property rights to be legally enforced.36  Liberalizing reforms of 
property rights for both international and domestic entrepreneurs encouraged 
growth in the real estate market, notably in the newly created Special 
Economic Zones.37  This era brought about an increasingly privatized China, 
necessarily decentralizing the CCP’s power and distributing it to various 
private sectors of society to boost the economy.38  
The success of these strategies in attracting foreign investment 
encouraged the government to expand its policies.39  By protecting property 
rights for investors, China had effectively catalyzed its economy and 
forcefully entered the international market as a viable competitor. 40   A 
current estimate places state-owned enterprises in the increasingly privatized 
PRC as responsible for only a third of the national output value.41  In 2002, 
President Jiang Zemin encouraged the Chinese to “conform to the time and 
follow the law of development and display great creativity...keeping pace 
with the times.”42  In order to sustain an energetic entry on the international 
market, Jiang’s government recognized the importance of further defining 
property rights.43  This was not in the interest of creating vested rights in the 
citizenry at large, however: it functioned to protect the interests of investors, 
with the hope of catalyzing the economy.44  In 2005, National People’s 
Congress45 chairman Wu Bangguo declared “[t]he property law is one of the 
cardinal laws that supports our socialist legal framework with Chinese 
characteristics, and it plays an important role in protecting the fundamental 
                                                 
35  TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 242 (2d ed. 2004). 
36  Asia: Ideological gymnastics; China, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2004, at 68. 
37  SPENCE, supra note 22, at 674. 
38  Jieming Zhu, Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of China’s 
Transition Economy, 26 INT’L. J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 52, 54 (2002). 
39  Yingyi Qian, supra note 28, at 14 (citing that foreign direct investment in China increased from 
4.4 billion in 1991 to 28 billion in 1993). 
40  Lan Cao, Chinese Privatization: Between Plan and Market, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13 
(2000). 
41  James A. Dorn, China’s Future Depends Upon Protecting Rights, ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
July 19, 2004, at A9. 
42  SAICH, supra note 35 at 346-47. 
43  Id. at 243. 
44  Id. at 242-43. 
45  The National People’s Congress is defined in the 1982 Constitution as “the highest organ of state 
power.”  See CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: China’s Government Structure, available at 
http://cecc.gov. [hereinafter Government Structure].  
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interests of our people and our economic system.”46  The national goal of 
managing these competing interests becomes a balancing test for the 
People’s Congress.47  To further its interests, the CCP initiated the “Three 
Represents” campaign to frame the future of China around “representing the 
development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of 
China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the people.”48  Some legal scholars interpret this 
campaign as a methodology to incorporate capitalists into the CCP’s 
membership, as a way of institutionalizing the economic development 
instigated by these private parties.49     
In order to further its economic strength in the world market, China 
became a member of international organizations and party to a number of 
international agreements.50  Among these, China ratified the United Nations 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
2001(“ICESCR”). 51   The document, which sets forth an international 
standard of human rights for its parties, defines “forced evictions” as “the 
permanent or temporary removal against the will of individuals…from the 
homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access 
to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.”52  The ICESCR further 
stipulates that “forced evictions are prima facie incompatible” with the 
document’s purpose.53  China gained international legitimacy as a result of 
ratifying the ICESCR, and found itself on equal footing with other nations 
within the realm of international law.54  The policy to clarify property rights 
was originally established to further foreign interests, but with that objective 
                                                 
46  Shi Jiangtao, NPC Delays Passage of Property Legislation Disagreement over Compensation for 
State Requisitions Is a Major Reason, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 2005. 
47   Dorn, supra note 41. 
48  Jia Hepeng, The Three Represents Campaign: Reform the Party or Indoctrinate the Capitalists?, 
24 CATO J. 261, 261 (2004).  
49  See, e.g., Hepeng, supra note 48 (proposing that Chinese legal reforms, including the 2004 
constitutional amendments, were enacted to legitimize capitalist membership in the CCP).  
50  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, art. 17, 
establishing property ownership and protection guarantees; FORCED EVICTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
U.N.H.C.R. Fact Sheet No. 25(1996) (declaring forced evictions in violation of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights). 
51  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Sup. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1996), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 
Jan. 3, 1976, art. 11., ratified by China on June 27, 2001.  The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 7 reemphasizes the right to adequate housing and freedom from forced 
evictions (1991). 
52  The Right to Adequate Housing (Art.11.1): Forced Evictions. THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, CESCR General Comment 7, May 20, 1997. 
53  Id. 
54  Frank Ching, In the Eye of the Beholder, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 2005. 
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gained, China’s global reputation now entails enacting domestic property 
rights reform to protect individual interests. 
 
B. China’s Current Property Regime and Regulations Regarding Urban 
Demolition and Relocation Provide Inadequate Means for Legal 
Redress 
 
Despite an apparent legal framework, the CCP’s present law 
providing the procedures for demolition and relocation fails to present 
sufficient avenues for the aggrieved.  Following recognition and investment 
from the global community, the CCP enacted domestic property rights 
reforms.55  The Land Management Law’s amendments in 1986 reflect this 
recognition of domestic property rights, declaring that the right to use State 
or collectively owned land could be allocated by law.56  Accompanying this 
evolution, China gave recognition to individual property rights in the form 
of land-use rights.57  Because all urban land is owned by the state, fee simple 
ownership is not possible.  The law still confers a certain degree of usufruct 
rights to the citizens residing on the state’s land, however, allowing them to 
use the land as if it were their own. 58   This land-use right essentially 
functions as a leasehold wherein the individual resident has the right to use 
the land without restriction, given proper allocation by the state.59   
The People’s Congress also passed constitutional amendments 
regarding private property rights in 2004.60  These amendments legitimize a 
degree of capitalist activity in socialist terms by maintaining the state’s right 
to seize lands for public use, a right mitigated by language that was added to 
ensure proper compensation.61  Citizens were encouraged by the language of 
the amendments and eagerly bought 2.8 million copies of the amended 
                                                 
55  See discussion in Lan Cao, supra note 40. 
56  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tu di guan li fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 2, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).   
57  Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of the Urban Real Estate, art. 22 
(adopted January 1, 2001), translated in ISINOLAW. 
58  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tu di guan li fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 8, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005); see also STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN 
CHINA AFTER MAO 184 (1999). 
59  LUBMAN, supra note 58, at 184. 
60  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo xian fa xiu zhen gan [Amendments to Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2004, effective Mar. 14, 2004), 
translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Aug. 23, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Amendments]. 
61  Amendments, supra note 60, art. 22 provides, “The lawful private property of citizens shall not be 
encroached upon…the State may, in the public interest, expropriate or requisition private property of 
citizens and pay compensation in accordance with the law”; see also Hepeng, supra note 48. 
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Constitution.62  This constitutional language also provided encouragement to 
those in the Chinese legal community who advocated for passage of the 
amendments.63  A facial reading of these amendments reveal a similarity to 
the United States’ Takings Clause, which also guarantees the right to “just 
compensation” for the government’s use of eminent domain.64   
These amendments contrast with China’s historic legal record, which 
continues to threaten the private right to own land. 65   Despite these 
capitalistic amendments, the government’s extensive history of favoritism 
towards economic development allows for land seizures in the “public 
interest.”66  As such, the nature of the leaseholds granted to private citizens 
to live on the state’s urban land is perpetually subject to government control 
and regulation.67  For example, the Beijing Olympics project has cleared 
miles upon miles of residential land to make way for green spaces and 
hosting facilities.68  The official reason for clearing away the traditional 
residences and alleyways was that the old homes were “dangerous,” but 
most evicted residents remain unconvinced.69  Other takings justified by the 
“public interest” involve the building of new luxury condominiums, 
shopping malls, and commercial office buildings. 70   According to 
government statistics, over thirty million people have had their residential 
land requisitioned for development, in large part for the country’s massive 
Olympic project.71   
 
1. The Procedure of Urban Demolition and Relocation Results in Unfair 
Consequences for Those Forcefully Evicted for Development Projects. 
 
The law regarding urban demolition and relocation passed by the 
People’s Congress provides framework for procedures to evict but lacks 
                                                 
62  Grady Epstein, Chinese Reforms Yet to Register at Local Levels; the Chinese Constitution 
Guarantees Both Individual and Property Rights—on Paper, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 18, 2004, at 1.A 
63  Id. 
64  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
65  See generally Jacques deLisle, Property Rights Reform in China, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE, January 29, 2004.   
66  Jieming Zhu, Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of China’s 
Transition Economy, 26 INT’L. J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 52 (March 2002).  
67  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tu di guan li fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 8, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).   
68  Jane Macartney, Thousands of homes destroyed to make way for Olympic tourists, TIMES (UK), 
May 26, 2005. 
69  John Taylor, Beijing Gets a Facelift Ahead of 2008 Olympics, WORLD TODAY, July 22, 2005. 
70  FINANCIAL EXPRESS, supra note 16. 
71  Id. 
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clarity and transparency to claim compensation.  The Administrative 
Regulations on Urban House Demolition and Relocation (“Regulations”) 
provide the process for a developer or the state to apply for demolition of a 
property.72  Once the demolition is approved, the private developer or the 
state then negotiates compensation with the residents of the property.73  The 
only stipulation on notice is that local governments must alert the urban 
residents sometime before approval or amendment of a development plan.74  
Some municipalities require notice to the residents, but there is no national 
standard. 75   The Regulations clearly state that upon approval of the 
development plans, the evictee must move out within the specified time limit, 
even if negotiation regarding monetary compensation is not complete.76  The 
evictees may dispute the offered compensation, but the developers have the 
right to “advance enforcement.”77  There is no way for the residents to 
challenge the underlying eviction ex ante, only the compensation amount ex 
post.  As a result, many evictees attempt to stay in their homes until 
agreement is reached.78  This often causes violent forced evictions, where 
the evicting authorities take matters into their own hands, frequently 
employing dangerous demolition methods.79  Reports allege that electricity 
and water supplies are shut off in order to drive out persistent residents.80  
Some residents claim they have come home to find their homes demolished 
without warning, while others report measures as extreme as arson. 81  
Evictees even report demolition crews yelling “Earthquake!” in the middle 
of the night in order to clear residents: in other instances, the demolition 
begins while families are still inside. 82   These clearance methods are 
purportedly responsible for many accidental deaths during dangerous 
evictions.83 
These same Regulations further stipulate that adjudication boards that 
handle compensation disputes are “the administrative departments in charge 
                                                 
72  See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, Ch. 2-3. 
73  Davis and Hai, supra note 11, at 13. 
74  See Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Chengzhen Fangwu Gongzuo Weihu Shehui Wending de Jinji 
Tongzhi [Urgent Circular Concerning Better Implementation of Urban Development to Protect Social 
Stability] (issued on Sept. 19, 2003 by the State Council). 
75  Pamela Phan, Enriching the Land or the Political Elite? Lessons From China on Democratization 
of the Urban Renewal Process, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y. J. 607, 632 (2005). 
76  See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, art. 16. 
77  Id. art. 15. 
78  Davis and Hai, supra note 11, at 3. 
79  Epstein, supra note 63. 
80  Davis and Hai, supra note 11, at 11. 
81  Id. at 9. 
82  Id. 
83  Liu Qing, supra note 9, at 70. 
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of housing demolition and relocation,” which are comprised of the same 
people who approved the demolition in the first place.84  As the beneficiaries 
of fees and other costs paid by developers, these boards are often biased.85  
There are further allegations that various municipal administrative boards 
are corrupt bureaucracies tilted in favor of the developers, as well as 
speculation of bribes and pay-offs.86  These governmental bodies’ interests, 
in their capacities as regulators of socialist market forces, are prone to align 
themselves with helping the flourishing economy at the cost of the 
evictees. 87   Chinese lawyer Gao Zhisheng reported to China Economic 
Times that “officials at all levels of the bureaucracy routinely operate as if 
these laws don’t exist.”88  The offered compensation amount will rarely 
adequately cover the cost of a new home in the area, adding to the problem 
of homelessness in China.89 
The Regulations offer a final, yet still inadequate, avenue of legal 
redress.90  If a party remains unsatisfied with the amount offered, they then 
may file for civil suit in the People’s Court.91  This measure has also proven 
ineffective, however, to assist evicted tenants battling compensation 
amounts. 92   Most complaints and negotiations are already stifled in the 
administrative stage described above, and usually with massive 
disappointment on the part of the tenant.93  To further frustrate these efforts, 
the Supreme People’s Court recently issued a ruling that People’s Courts are 
not to accept compensation disputes until the proscribed adjudication 
remedies are exhausted, or until the evictees have accepted a compensation 
settlement with the developers.94  Though this exhaustion requirement seems 
routine and equitable, most claims are dispensed with in the administrative 
process and never reach the civil courts.95   
                                                 
84  See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, art. 16. 
85  Liu Qing, supra note 9, at 68. 
86  Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 6-7. 
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90  See Administrative Regulations, supra note 18, art. 16. 
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92  Phan, supra note 75, at 609. 
93  Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 14. 
94  Written Reply of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issue that When the Party Concerned Refuses 
to Accept the Ruling of Overturning His/Her Application for Revoking the Arbitration Award and Applies 
for Re-trial, the Pepole’s Court Shall Not Accept the Application, translated in ISINOLAW. (Supreme 
People’s Court, July 26, 2004). 
95  Davis & Hai, supra note 11, at 16-7. 
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The Chinese judiciary has yet to recognize a claim based on 
constitutionally based rights.96  Attempts to bring a civil suit or petition 
officials often results in incarceration, and there are even reports of officials 
preventing evictees from boarding trains to Beijing to air their grievances 
and protest at the capital.97  Evicted residents who manage to organize a 
challenge and file a case in civil court find themselves routinely turned away 
for lack of jurisdiction or authority over the previous agency’s decision. 98   
According to one source, of over 18,000 real estate disputes filed in Beijing, 
less than 4,000 were actually heard in the first half of 2004.99  Among the 
hundreds of thousands of evictees, many remain homeless as a result of 
receiving minimal or no compensation for their homes, and others were 
forced to move far outside the cities where their families lived for 
generations.100  Many of those evicted cannot afford to live in the new urban 
landscape and are left out of the growing market economy.101   
 
2. The Unenforceability of These Regulations Emphasizes the Tension 
Between the CCP’s Motivations for Economic Development and the 
Social Need for More Predictable Property Rights.  
 
These regulations and unfair practices highlight the tension between 
the Chinese government’s interests in encouraging economic development 
while also providing for the population.  While there remains a residual 
national pride in China’s newfound wealth, frustration has spread throughout 
the cities. 102   Thus, the existing regulations and reforms, while still an 
impressive step, fall victim to a larger constellation of problems in China: 
the government’s interest in economic development is too strong, monetary 
incentives encourage corruption in the bureaucracy, and the system lacks 
accountability, all while the widening social gap grows daily. 103   The 
decentralization of the CCP’s power base has generated myriad private, 
                                                 
96  Hepeng, supra note 48, at 264. 
97  Liu Qing, supra note 9, at 68. 
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municipal, and governmental interest parties all competing in the lucrative 
real estate market in China, rendering the private leaseholds subject to these 
powerful entities.104  Chinese property reforms appear enforceable and fair 
on the macro level, but prove weak and subject to governmental interests in 
practice, creating a need for transparency. 105   Unfair as it may seem, 
favoring economic development over individual property rights is not a new 
concept for a fast-growing nation. 
 
III. IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AMERICAN AND CHINESE 
POLICIES ARE STRIKINGLY SIMILAR IN METHODOLOGY 
  
 In this era of international standards and human rights law, China’s 
actions appear extreme.  The early United States, however, utilized 
analogous policies in order to accomplish successful development.  China’s 
willingness to use governmental powers to side with private developers at 
the expense of the individual mirrors the United States government’s 
policies in the nineteenth century.   
 
A. Nineteenth Century American Policies Regarding Economic 
Development Closely Resemble Current Chinese Procedures 
  
The appearance of the Chinese government rampantly abusing human 
rights takes on a more nuanced character when compared to American 
nineteenth century jurisprudence.  The CCP’s siding with private developers 
in order to stimulate modernization parallels strategies undertaken by the 
early American government.  The current interpretation of the Chinese 
constitutional amendments is in actuality not a far cry from early 
interpretations of the Takings Clause.  Although theorists deem strong 
property rights are required to establish a resilient economy, the historical 
record reveals that this was not consistently the case in early United States.  
What began as a tenuous right to property in nineteenth century America has 
morphed into an absolute and guaranteed right as each era has espoused its 
own interpretation.106  In early America, the “public interest” of economic 
prosperity overrode individual rights.107  While this young economy was 
transitioning, the weaker property rights of individuals contributed to the 
                                                 
104  Phan, supra note 75, at 618. 
105  Dorn, supra note 41. 
106  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA 43 (2002). 
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strength of developers, driving the market forces to a stable state.108  Thus, 
the concept of American “vested rights” arose as a social construction only 
after the strength of the nation’s economy was secure.  These rights are 
subject to the socioeconomic conditions and needs of the nation, and no 
single definition can be the universal optimum.109  The evolution of the early 
definition of American property rights is explored in the next section. 
 
1. The United States Legislature Encouraged Policies of Production and 
Growth 
   
During the early development of the American economy, strong 
government regulation of land use was generally an allowable tactic to 
advance the fledging market economy.110  The conception of early American 
government’s laissez-faire market economy is largely a myth that gives way 
to an era of strong government regulation of land use.111  The public right to 
land was often cited as justification for private takings, often with 
compensation below market value, or in extreme cases, none at all.112  James 
Willard Hurst characterizes this era as an attempt by American government 
to “release energy” by encouraging private developers to make the best use 
of land.113   These policies were similar to the current Chinese property 
regime, allocating vast amounts of resources to the hands of the wealthy elite 
in order to best accommodate the market economy. 114   The concept of 
property rights emerges as a social creation in an examination of the early 
American interest in creating a legitimate role for its emerging corporate 
wealth.115     
In the drive to catalyze America’s fledging economy, there was no 
absolute right to property, as individual rights were subservient to the 
government’s interest in developing its national market.  Diverging from the 
original English legal tradition that absolutely protected vested rights, the 
American policy in the early nineteenth century favored dynamic, 
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productive property over static property at rest.116  This principle resulted in 
private investment spurring the economy at the cost of the individuals who 
simply had no legal recourse.  Early American jurisprudence placed the 
burden of persuasion on the injured, during an era where 
“[n]oncompensation was the general rule, not the exception.”117    
Studies of this period highlight a great deal of expropriation and 
confiscation without compensation while emphasizing the coercive nature of 
property in any society.118  Legislatures were eager to attract investment, 
oftentimes at the expense of individual property owners. 119   Many 
Americans found themselves without legal recourse, even when eminent 
domain powers were not used for traditional “public use” but for delegating 
resources to private parties, with whom the government sided.120  In other 
words, the public power of eminent domain transferred interests wholesale 
to private entrepreneurs while the aggrieved property owners found the 
courts largely unresponsive.121 
 
2. The United States Judiciary Deferred to the Pro-Growth Policies of 
the Legislature 
     
The interest in forging a dynamic market economy was the chief 
concern of both lawmakers and the supportive judiciary in a fledging 
America. 122   The judiciary exercised extensive deference to these 
government decisions to take property as well as maintaining a liberal 
definition of “public interest.”123  The public interest defined itself in terms 
of what a situation or community deemed necessary at the time, even if the 
principle beneficiary was private profit.124  Decisions such as the Shreveport 
Cases, where Chief Justice Shaw declared that “the law aims to be practical, 
and to favor what is practicable,” reveal the mindset of the judiciary at the 
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time.125  Hurst observes that these rulings characterize the legacy of the 
nineteenth century United States, and its tendency to highly value “change 
more than stability…property in motion or at risk rather than property secure 
and at rest.”126  Protecting private property, then, was a means to an end.  
“Vested rights” were thus developed in order to open up the continent and 
facilitate business interests to generate and protect venture capital, not the 
individual property rights of the citizens.127  For example, in Wisconsin, a 
federal judge supported the government’s delegation of the power of 
eminent domain to a private waterpower developer, simply by assuming that 
capital had been invested and economic prosperity had resulted.128   
The government used positive law in order to achieve its goals, 
maximizing the productive potential of a developing nation. 129   Justice 
Holmes wrote, in support of these policies, that “the absolute protection of 
property…is hardly consistent with the requirements of modern business.”130  
In fact, damnum absque injuria (an injury without a remedy) was a common 
judicial tool for legal positivists in early America, where judges were not 
uncomfortable leaving victims without compensation as long as the 
government had a semblance of just cause.131  As William J. Novak puts it, 
judicial decisions during this time of development did not “reason upward 
from private rights and particular injuries…instead they reasoned downward 
from autonomous conceptions of state powers, public rights, and the general 
welfare of the society.” 132   Novak observes that much of the courts’ 
instrumentalist tendency ultimately favored “large and efficient, private 
developmental interests in the release of capitalist energies,” thus supporting 
wide police powers in a strongly-regulated United States. 133   
 
 
                                                 
125  Shreveport Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (declaring the social desirability of free individual action 
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B. Comparing Early American Policies and Current Chinese Practice 
Reveals Similar Strategies of Economic Development with Different 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Despite contrasting ideologies, early American and current Chinese 
policies follow analogous paths in developing their respective national 
markets.  As the above discussion reveals, the early American government 
was not adverse to seizing private property and allocating these resources to 
private developers.  The CCP currently undertakes these same methods in 
order to accomplish its economic goals.  The vulnerability of property rights 
in China, however, has reached a breaking point, and China has the legal 
infrastructure to enact its own reforms without adopting Western methods.  
Under the international gaze, it is in China’s interest to give weight to 
individual property rights and enforce the constitutional right to 
compensation. 
In many ways, the early American record and the current Chinese 
policies defy the assumption that clearly defined and predictable property 
and contractual rights are prerequisites to foster economic growth. 134  
Economic theories posit that clearly defined property rights such as the right 
to definitively own, sell, and benefit from one’s property are key to the 
positive growth of a market economy,135 while vaguely defined rights create 
inefficiencies and hinder growth.136  Both the early American legal system 
and China’s relatively weak system, however, challenge this assumption.137  
 The Chinese courts are now facilitating the same interests as 
nineteenth century American jurists, assisting the government in achieving 
national development goals.  In order to most efficiently use resources, 
particularly land, the CCP is utilizing the Constitutional language that “the 
State may, in the public interest, expropriate or requisition private property 
of citizens and pay compensation in accordance with the law.”138  China is 
allocating public resources to private developers in order to “release 
energy”139 previously tied up in stable, secured residential property.140  As of 
September 2004, 94,480,000 square meters of property were “idle,” with 
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residential land accounting for 57,360,000 of that total. 141   The policy 
decision to transform these lands from “idle” to “productive” mirrors the 
nineteenth century American notion that property held by private developers 
was preeminently dynamic, rather than static, “property” being a political 
concept that could be morphed to best fit the needs of the country.142   
By maintaining control over and responsibility for the commercial 
sector, the Chinese government remains ideologically communist.143  Due to 
unmanageably rapid growth, however, the State must prioritize economic 
expansion at the expense of many citizens displaced by the necessary 
development.144  In order to achieve this growth, the CCP has essentially 
delegated its regulating powers to the private companies in order to enact a 
trickle-down effect, justifying takings for the public good.  This policy is 
particularly relevant and rhetorically effective in a communist society, where 
the entire economy depends on the collective productive forces working for 
the collective public good.145  The wealth of a communist country, in other 
words, depends on the state both controlling and providing production 
venues for the masses.  This necessarily renders the term “for public 
necessity” ambiguous in a communist society, where wealth for one is in 
theory wealth for all.146    
Though China’s political climate is notably violent in comparison 
with the early American liberal use of eminent domain, 147  the policies 
undertaken are not as divergent as initially perceived.  China is a country 
that is undertaking what is necessary to advance itself to the world stage and 
mimicking strategies used by its predecessors, but is uniquely Chinese at its 
foundation.148  Nonetheless, American history reveals that absolute property 
rights cannot be guaranteed during a transitional economy.149  Examples 
from early American history do not justify China’s current abuses and lack 
of legal clarity, but rather add nuance to the criticisms of the CCP’s policies.  
While the development strategies succeeded in stimulating the market in the 
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United States, the Chinese now face the peculiar problem of an increasingly 
privatized economy under a communist political regime.150   
As the inequities of the market regulation become progressively more 
apparent, the common collective and individual private citizens absorb this 
predicament as the most vulnerable sector.151  Comparable to the post-New 
Deal era in American jurisprudence, there will come a time when this gap 
can no longer be ignored and a fair and equitable system must be practically 
applied. 152   Given the Chinese population’s dichotomous sentiments of 
frustration and sense of entitlement evidenced in the mass protests, 
combined with international scrutiny, it appears that time could be drawing 
near for China.  The solution, however, is not to be found in mimicking 
American policies: China’s history and processes should shape a uniquely 
Chinese reform. 
 
IV. CHINA SHOULD REFORM ITS PROCEDURES FOR URBAN DEMOLITION AS 
A STEP TOWARD ITS OWN UNIQUE RULE OF LAW 
 
 The CCP should renovate its property regime to include more 
transparent rights as it advances its socialist rule of law.153  The Chinese 
citizenry’s rights are solidifying but remain largely unenforceable. 154  
Consistent with Chinese reluctance to adopt Western models, the CCP 
studies other existing governments but insists on remaining ideologically 
true to its socialist foundation.  Given the intensified scrutiny from both 
governments and interests groups abroad, China should take affirmative 
steps toward establishing a more equitable system for evictees.   
 
A. China Has Already Initiated Reforms Consistent with Its Own 
Characteristics As It Works Toward Economic and Social Goals 
  
The CCP is not averse to reforming its fledging legal system, but 
refuses to depart from its policy of taking a unique Chinese path.  The 
natural tendency in light of the discussion above is to recommend that the 
Chinese government should undergo massive legal reforms that would 
include recognition of personal property rights to ownership.  It is also easy 
to suggest that China should enforce its constitutional amendments as 
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America started to do once the economy proved itself secure.  While these 
ideas are optimal, they are unrealistic in light of China’s policy of avoiding 
Western political mechanisms.  The CCP recently released its first White 
Paper on Democracy, stating its national goals to work toward a true 
People’s Democracy. 155   In this policy announcement, the CCP 
acknowledged it had a long way to go in combining the Marxist theory of 
democracy with the reality of China, and was learning from other political 
civilizations. 156   China’s socialist political democracy as reiterated 
throughout the White Paper, however, should build its democracy based on 
its own socialist experience and historical process without copying any other 
political model.157 
National leaders approve of this approach.  An official of the People’s 
Supreme Court reflected this approach in an interview, saying that “China 
should base itself on its national situation instead of mechanically copying 
the experiences gained by [other countries] because China is a socialist 
country carrying out the people’s congress system and its state, political, and 
judicial systems are essentially different from those of the western 
countries.”158   Even regarding a new draft of property law – something 
admittedly alien to modern China – a Chinese legal expert has said:  
 
“[T]he present-day China has no reason to choose [laws from 
other nations] as the example for making its own law of 
property.  The future law of property in China should be able to 
fully reflect and meet the trend and generalization of changes in 
relations of property in the modernization of man…”159   
 
These Chinese officials and experts represent a fundamental tenet of 
China’s current global politics: socialist policies will prevent the wholesale 
adoption of capitalist property laws and regulations.    
Though the above discussion highlights the CCP’s reluctance to 
modify its structural format, a recent revision to the judicial system is 
helpful in illuminating the types of reform the Chinese are willing to make.  
The Chinese judiciary, appointed by the CCP, has been criticized for lack of 
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independence, impartiality, and subsequently being prone to corruption.  In 
response to this censure, the National People’s Congress prompted the 
People’s Supreme Court to implement reforms in an effort to create a better 
system of adjudication.160 
One example of such reforms addresses the Chinese system of 
People’s Jurors, a legal mechanism adapted from the U.S.S.R., in place since 
the 1950s.161  Initially a response to accusations of corruption and a lack of 
independence in their judiciary, the People’s Jurors were citizens appointed 
to the bench alongside with the judicial officers.162  The appointees were 
largely uneducated, however, and as such the jurors proved to be no more 
than the implementation of symbolic figures without any real authority.163   
 The 2004 reforms to the system of People’s Jurors reveal a basic yet 
uniquely Chinese solution to the problem of alleged judicial corruption.164  
Now, many of the People’s Jurors are elected by the districts in which they 
serve for a term of five years.165  These reforms require citizens to meet 
minimal education standards and complete basic legal training before sitting 
with the judges.166  They serve on a bench with three official judges upon 
request by parties at the initiation of the trial.167  People’s Jurors then have 
the same powers as the judges do and can vote alongside them in both 
criminal and civil cases.168  Jurors are also called in to hear cases “with 
considerable social repercussions,” in a representative capacity for the public, 
acting as the equivalent of a magistrate.169  The president of the Supreme 
People’s Court said the reform was representative of the fact that “during 
such a period [of gaining wealth], the country needs improvement in its 
judicial capacity.”  The CCP further stipulates that the purpose for adopting 
of these measures was to allow transparency in the judiciary and assist in the 
guarantee of the citizens’ rights.170 
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 The process for urban demolition and relocation could benefit from 
similar equitable rights, guarantees, transparency and accountability, guided 
by Chinese values and political philosophy.  Reforming the system of 
People’s Jurors represents a willingness on the part of the Chinese to adopt 
certain democratic-style innovations, while still maintaining Chinese 
characteristics—a value insisted on by the government.171  Though it would 
only be a step toward fair compensation, a system like the People’s Jurors 
would initiate a more transparent, predictable judicial hearing for evictees.  
These renovations would begin to combat the corruption of the urban 
redevelopment program.  Currently, the board consists of CCP-appointed 
administrators who both approve of and collect fees for the original 
demolition.  As the Regulations stand now, the board that adjudicates is 
unfairly biased as the same board that approves of demolition if residents 
dispute compensation offered by the developer.  If citizen jurors were seated 
on the adjudication board, a resident could hope for more adequate monetary 
compensation.  Though it remains to be seen how much change the People’s 
Jurors will effect, a similar system could be implemented at the 
administrative level of the eviction hearings in reviewing compensation 
amounts to generate more unbiased judgment.  
 Measures such as these could be taken to further legitimize the 
amendments and other facial reforms the Chinese have made.  The People’s 
Congress expressed its concern for the human rights of its citizens in a white 
paper entitled “China’s Progress in Human Rights in 2004,” stating, “[t]he 
Chinese Government pays special attention to respecting and safeguarding 
human rights.  It will take effective measures to promote the development of 
human rights and to raise the level of human rights and basic freedoms 
enjoyed by the Chinese people.”172  Despite the reluctance shown by the 
CCP to rapidly liberalize social controls and implement massive reform in 
this area, small steps are being taken.  In the socio-political arena, where 
massive protests are occurring on a daily basis, it is perhaps time the CCP 
acted on its alleged concern for human rights and granted the citizenry a 
substantial right, such as just compensation, even if the residents still cannot 
challenge an underlying eviction.173  The hope is that, in the end, China will 
enforce its version of Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence.  In 
the meantime, a step toward an equitable system of compensation will help 
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maintain stability.174  As the Chinese urban population stages protest after 
protest, the social strife becomes palpable.175 
 
B. China Is Ripe for Reform and Should Renovate Its Legal System, 
Beginning with the Property Regime  
 
 The social turmoil in China resulting from the shortcomings of the 
legal system necessitate reform.  Much has been written on the inadequacies 
of China’s property regime, particularly in light of the recent economic 
boom.  Given the nature of comparative law, it is difficult not to recommend 
installation of political reforms such as separation of powers, creation of an 
independent judiciary, and other democratic principles. 176   It is also 
presumptuous, however, to assume these mechanisms can be imported to 
China’s unique system and be as effective as they have proven to be in other 
nations. 177   While it is hopeful for tenants to be able to challenge the 
underlying eviction instead of just the compensation amount, and to 
recommend that the adjudication board be independent from the department 
responsible for the initial approval of demolition plans, these solutions fail to 
address the character of Chinese government and its deeper problems.   
 The unitary party system in China disallows true independence from 
any other branch of government, while the top-down process of legislation 
ensures provincial and state governments only exercise powers specifically 
delegated to them.  This system of delegation allows for rampant corruption 
in the local governments, however, as the system lacks credible enforcement 
mechanisms. 178   There is no separation of powers, either vertically or 
horizontally, creating a system of relatively loosely connected centers of 
local power, all stemming from the apex of the National People’s Congress, 
the central agent of the CCP. 179    
In the specific case of forced evictions, the lack of uniformity results 
in the various municipalities each creating its own policies within the sphere 
of the nationally-issued Regulations.180  The People’s Congress’ Regulations 
for Urban House Demolition and Relocation and 2003 Constitutional 
Amendments remain too vague for consistent implementation, as evidenced 
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by the variance of execution from province to province.  While many local 
governments have taken notable and impressive steps toward a more 
equitable system of urban development, others remain convoluted and 
oppressive.181  For example, the city of Qingdao passed a circular in April 
2005 that requires developers to obtain approval of ninety-five percent of the 
affected residents before they proceed with plans.182  In contrast, Beijing 
remains frustratingly opaque and corrupt in its city’s massive remodeling 
project.183  Though serving as examples of potential for change, policies that 
vary from city to city have little effect on the national front.  Genuine 
national reforms can only originate from the People’s Congress, where a 
uniform policy and procedure for land requisitions and compensation could 
be created.       
Despite the progress of property regime reform at some municipal 
levels, the national government is the only way to disseminate a uniformly 
equal policy across China.  Corruption within the unitary, one-party CCP 
system, however,  hinders efforts for achieving such a uniform policy.  To 
be fair, corruption has been a problem in all transitional governments, but 
China has made little progress to address this crippling issue. 184   As 
economic development consumes the nation while commercialization and 
investment create more wealth to feed the corruption cycle, the CCP has not 
revised its hierarchical system to reflect this evolving society. 185   As 
economic liberalizations have occurred in the past few decades, the CCP has 
seen an upswing in reported corruption, as the incentive to personal revenue 
grows in an increasingly profitable economy.186  While reluctant to abandon 
its bureaucratic procedures, the CCP is currently taking steps to eradicate the 
pervasive corruption within.187  Still insistent on developing its own socialist 
market economy within the established unitary political body, the CCP is 
taking steps to cleanse the administrative and judicial processes, as 
demonstrated by the People’s Jurors.188  The CCP remains the sole organ of 
power and dissemination, and it is only from the National People’s Congress 
that countrywide change will come.189   
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C. The Chinese People Should Capitalize on International Pressure to 
Advance Property Rights Reform 
 
China’s development comes at a time when international standards are 
not only emergent, but established, which differs from the fledging 
American experience in the nineteenth through early twentieth centuries.  
The Chinese government endured and achieved economic development 
beyond global expectations within the past twenty years, but that 
development has come at a price. 190   While China’s economy is benefiting 
from being party to international agreements, a previously isolated China is 
now under the critical scrutiny of the international community as a party to 
international covenants and a member of the World Bank.191  China’s desire 
for legitimacy on the global level necessitates a degree of adherence to 
international rules and norms.  This entails not only ratifying an international 
covenant, but also taking genuine steps to enforce its provisions.  This 
experience differs in the level of international scrutiny and expectations to 
which the United States was not subjected to in the late nineteenth to early 
twentieth century. 
For example, in 2005 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights held hearings regarding China’s progress in enforcing the 
covenant ratified in 2001.192  The Committee, finding a lackluster effort on 
the part of the Chinese government, filed numerous complaints and 
recommendations, including a special concern about the way in which the 
Olympics project was handled. 193   Regarding the forced evictions and 
relocations, the Committee asked China to implement “open, effective and 
meaningful consultations with affected residents.”194  This is but one way 
China’s entry into the international market affects its domestic policy 
decisions. 
The Olympics are China’s debutante ball, at which the nation intends 
to prove its modernization and discard its third-world status once and for 
all.195  The CCP is taking the event as seriously as a nation could, while 
quietly attempting to quash political dissent within its borders to avoid 
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controversy and scrutiny.196  China’s worst nightmare is a repeat of the 1968 
Mexico City Olympics when thirty student protestors were killed on the eve 
of the Games, or perhaps, the 1988 Seoul Olympics where publicly 
broadcasted mass protests helped persuade the country to concede 
democratic elections to the people.197  Activists claim that a city hosting the 
Olympics ought to represent ideals such as human dignity and harmonious 
development that are enshrined in the Olympic Charter and Code of Ethics.  
These activists are set on ensuring that the values are not only symbolized, 
but also realized.198 
The torch does not light in Beijing until August 2008, but the anxiety 
for has begun.  China lost the bid for the 2000 Olympics in large part due to 
human rights abuses.199  This coming of age for China unavoidably involves 
acknowledgment of international standards, including the right to adequate 
housing and freedom from forced eviction.200  The CCP still has time before 
the hundreds of thousands of international journalists arrive. 
 Instigating reforms for clarity and transparency in the urban eviction 
procedure might also function to quell surging domestic protests and civil 
unrest.  Currently, the techniques used by the State to suppress political 
activity and protests are failing to stop the massive demonstrations that 
plague domestic Chinese society.201  According to one report, the number of 
collective acts of protest has risen six-fold in the past decade. 202   The 
population’s courage to speak out and protest government abuses comes 
from mottos the CCP itself promulgated, such as “The People’s Olympics.”  
The jubilation of the celebration in the streets upon winning the 2008 bid 
was not staged: the Chinese citizens are truly proud of their country.  It is 
perhaps this patriotism that inspires protests and hope for change.203  As the 
head official of Beijing’s Chaoyang district, Chen Gang puts it, “[t]he 
citizens’] political sense is maturing…the Games are changing our 
society.” 204   One man forcefully evicted has used his copy of the new 
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constitution to challenge local authorities, disputing his compensation 
amount.  He now sits on the sidewalk every day, protesting with a headband 
that reads, “[p]rotect the constitution and protect our rights.”205   
 The government is in a transitional period, one that historically has 
shown itself to inherently favor one class over another, catering to the 
private developers while fueling the frustration and resentment of the urban 
poor.206  This widening gap between the rich and poor is strikingly similar to 
the consequence of early American economic development, and especially 
out of place in a socialist regime.  This friction coupled with the sheer 
number of displaced or homeless evictees threatens the social structure the 
CCP has strived to create.  The residents should be given some development 
in the rule of law to renew their dwindling faith in the Party and the nation 




Aware of the global attention that the Beijing Olympics would attract, 
many countries with an eye on China’s treatment of human rights supported 
the bid in hopes that the government would respond by loosening its social 
controls.207  Instead of fulfilling these aspirations, the CCP has responded to 
evictee protests with incarceration and other methods of suppression, 
disregarding petitions and international calls for legal reform while touting 
advances toward the rule of law. 208   This inconsistency, given China’s 
current position on the world stage, cannot continue unnoticed or 
overshadowed by the country’s wealth.  The early American experience 
lacked this global character, and in this way the Chinese present is unique in 
that it is developing at a time where international law is not only established, 
but is used as a means to establish international standards.   
The stakes are high.  Following an era of strong government in early 
America, legal reforms and evolutions led to the rights-based framework in 
which we now live.  The means by which China will arrive at this 
conclusion will be necessarily “uniquely Chinese.” 209   Given that the 
practice of forced evictions is the source of most protests and social strife,210 
it is an ideal place to begin granting stronger rights.  By implementing a 
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system similar to the People’s Jurors in the procedures for urban demolition 
and relocation, the CCP could demonstrate to both its citizenry and the 
international community that it is maintaining its “Chinese characteristics,” 
while taking steps to enact a more transparent, equitable legal system.  
Although the interest in development currently overrides individual rights, a 
professor at the Beijing Institute of Technology remains optimistic, saying, 
“I hope that…more and more people will be able to pay attention to the 
Constitution and to safeguard the authority of the Constitution.”211 
 In writing about the necessity of balancing early American law with 
its policies, Justice Holmes looked forward to a time when the desire for a 
goal is examined as much as the means used to attain it.  Highlighting the 
complexity of legal policies in particular contexts, he noted that getting “the 
dragon out of his cave…you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what 
[his strength is].  But to get him out is only the first step.  The next step is 
either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal.”212  The 
time has come for Beijing to make its fledging legal regime a useful animal, 
as opposed to a tool to legitimize its interest of economic development.  
However similar China’s current situation is to the era in which Holmes 
wrote, the creation of a true socialist democracy will be a product of its own. 
These expectations will not be achieved easily.  At the Oriental Plaza, 
an upscale shopping center in Beijing, a homeless man and his father sit 
under a bridge holding a sign that says, “Homeless Because of the 
Olympics.” 213   Another evicted resident in Beijing complains that “the 
Olympics are a good thing for a few people, but not for the majority,”214 
reflecting a general malaise spreading throughout the entire country, not just 
at the epicenter of the Olympic project.  The dichotomy further emphasizes 
the international reputation at stake—with the global community watching, 
China could either alleviate fears by granting certain limited rights to its 
citizens, or could do nothing to its own detriment. 
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